A Look at Albanian Nationalism and the KLA
By John C. Sigler III
Since NATO, at American instigation, has
taken an interest in Kosovo we Westerners have been assaulted by a steady
barrage of propaganda meant to convince us that our intervention in Kosovo is
completely justified. The Serbs have been, more or less, portrayed as modern
Nazis, vicious ethnic butchers led by their maniacal leader, President
Milosevic. At the same time, the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo have been primarily
described as hapless victims of Serbian aggression, completely blameless and
innocent. The "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA) has been presented as a
completely justified organization established to defend the helpless masses of Albanians
in Kosovo against the ruthless Serbian onslaught. Of course, in serious
publications dealing with international affairs, much of this propaganda has
been blatantly debunked, but very little of this has been circulated widely in
the mainstream press as the government still has to justify, and maintain
public support for, an occupation of undetermined duration.
As has always been true, governments today
still rely upon the ignorance of the people to allow it a free hand. Luckily
for the governments of the West, especially the United States, ignorance of the
Balkans is nearly universal. Very few people not directly connected to the
Balkans in one way or another know anything about Yugoslavia and the Serbian
people or Kosovo and the Albanian people. This ignorance not only allows the
government's propaganda to work but, more dangerously, allows the propagandists
to actually rewrite history as they see fit. Therefore, the propaganda not only
generates support for the government's actions of today, but also vilifies an
entire nationality and glorifies another for tomorrow. The problem with this is
obvious to anyone familiar with Balkan history and Albanian history in
particular. We, in the West, are setting ourselves up for a major
disappointment as the likelihood of the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo turning
against us as soon as the Serbian threat is under control is very good. As one
major KLA leader put it, "If the West pushes the KLA to disappear, I will
start to prepare people to work for the withdrawal of NATO." 1 Or,
perhaps more to the point, "The Albanians will not be disarmed by anybody
anymore."2
Now that we in the West have decided to
endorse and support the KLA, this author feels that it is a worthy goal to take
a deep and penetrating look at it. Where did they come from? What do they
believe? What is it that they want to accomplish, especially now that Kosovo is
occupied by NATO? How do they view us? What can we expect from them? While this
essay isn't likely to answer any of these questions beyond debate, hopefully it
will shed some light upon the organization and help the reader form more
informed opinions about our involvement in Kosovo.
General notes about Kosovo and its
History
Kosovo, or technically Kosovo-Metohija, is
a relatively small (10908 sq. km.) province of the Serbian Republic, which is
part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It borders the now independent
state of Macedonia on the south and Albania to the southwest, while within
Yugoslavia it borders Serbia to the north and east and Montenegro to the
northwest. According to the 1986 census, Kosovo had a population of 1.8 million
people and more recent estimates place the pre-NATO population at just over two
million. Ethnically, the population was broken down in 1981 to 77.4% Albanian,
13.2% Serbian, 3.7% Serbian speaking Muslims, 2.2% Rom (Gypsy) and 1.7%
Montenegrin. 3 Current information becomes more difficult to rely
upon because of the lack of stability since Kosovo had its autonomy revoked in
1989. According to some sources, generally those sympathetic with the
Albanians, after the end of autonomy many Serbs began leaving Kosovo for
political reasons resulting in the Albanians constituting a 90% majority by the
middle 1990's. However, according to other sources generally more sympathetic
with the Serbs, while the Serbian population did decline in Kosovo between 1989
and 1991/2; this situation was quickly reversed with the arrival of Serbian
refugees from the three northern republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, &
Slovenia). This does actually make a bit more sense because after the
revocation of autonomy, Serbs were allowed completely discriminatory advantages
over Albanians in Kosovo. Population estimates also tend to support the
contention that there was not a massive flight of Serbs resulting in their
share of the ethnic percentage going down to around 4%.
The region known today as Kosovo has been a
part of Serbia since the establishment of the first Serb state in the ninth
century. The region derives the name "Kosovo" from the Serbian word
for "blackbird" (i.e. "land of the blackbirds") and is
first noted in historical sources in the twelfth century as the center of the
Serbian kingdom. Kosovo is the cradle of Serbian culture and even today is the
home of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate of Pec which was established in the
twelfth century. Most Serbian epic literature revolves around Kosovo,
especially because of the famous Battle of Kosovo in 1389, where the Serbs,
along with the Albanians, Bosnians, and Wallachians joined forces against the
Ottoman Turks. Although the Battle of Kosovo is still remembered as a heroic
fight, the Europeans lost and most of the Balkans fell to the Ottoman
Sultanate.
Albania did not actually fall to the
Ottomans until 1478, but not long after the Albanians nominally converted to
Islam4. As Muslims, they were favoured by the Ottoman administration
over the Serbs and other Slavic people who held strongly to their Eastern
Christianity. Under the Sultanate, the fortunes of the non-Muslim Slavs varied
depending upon the level of tolerance held by the reigning sovereign. The year
1690 changed much of this for the Serbs of Kosovo. In that year, the Serbs of
Kosovo found themselves between giants during the war between Austria-Poland
and the Ottoman Sultanate. As the Austrians swept into the Balkans, the Serbs
opted to side with Christian Serbia against the Muslim Ottomans. In 1690,
however, the Turks launched a successful counter attack against the Austrians
in the Balkans, retaking Bulgaria, Serbia and Transylvania. As the Austrians
retreated, most Serbs retreated with them fearing the inevitable reprisals of
the Turks. Led by Patriarch Arsenije Carnojevic IV, the Serbs of Kosovo
followed the Austrian Army in what became known as the "Great Serbian
Exodus" with most of the refugees settling in modern Vojvodina. In the
wake of the "Great Serbian Exodus", the Turks began colonizing Kosovo
with Albanians. While some Serbs did return, this is where the original
Albanian majority in Kosovo originated.
Everything remained much the same for
Kosovo as far as its official international position is concerned until the
nineteenth century. Serbia acquired its independence in 1878, with Kosovo as
part of it. Kosovo has been an integral part of Serbia proper ever since,
except for a brief period when Kosovo as well as Western Macedonia were ceded
by the Axis powers to Italian occupied Albania during the Second World War.
Albanian Nationalism and the Ideology
of the KLA
Albanian Nationalism
In order to understand the ideology of the
modern KLA, a general review of Albanian nationalism is deserved as so few
actually understand the unique nature of Albanian nationalism. Unlike the
nationalistic ideas of the West, and later most of the East as well, Albanian
nationalism did not find its basis in cultural unity or liberal principles but
instead was based almost exclusively upon ethnicity. Generally, in the West and
elsewhere, ethnicity only came to play a significant role in other nationalisms
as an extension of general ethnic bias based upon some further commonality,
like shared language among the Pan-Germans and Pan-Slavs or, considerably
later, the racial notions advanced throughout Central Europe based upon
physical similarities. In Germany for example, the ethno-racial nationalism of
the Nazis did not suddenly spring into existence, instead it was the end result
of a process that began with Prussian nationalism advanced itself into
Pan-Germanism and only much later evolved into racialism. In Albania, this was
not the case as Albania's isolation from the mainstream of European thought as
well as its domination by conservative Islamic beys5 largely
retarded Albanian national development. For this reason, a brief review of
Albanian history is deserved so the reader can see how new Albanian nationalism
really is.
Like most nationalities, the Albanians have
a national mythology which creates a proud an ancient lineage for their people
and their state. In the particular case of Albania, this national mythology is
based upon alleged descent from the ancient Illyrians whose kingdom is first
believed to have come into existence under the legendary King Hyllus c. 1225
BCE and survived until the reign of King Gentius who was defeated and captured
by Rome in 165 BCE. While the unique nature of the Albanian language provides a
bit of circumstantial support for this national myth, the origins of this idea
do deserve a bit of further investigation.
While it could be true that the modern
Albanians descend from the ancient Illyrians, the Albanians themselves appear
to have had absolutely no knowledge of this until the later nineteenth century.
With the Ottoman Sultanate's power on the decline in the Balkans, the Dual
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary began to play a much larger role in the Balkans,
seeking to replace the Turks as the leading power broker in the region. While
peoples like the Serbs and Croats, with their much further developed national
ideas proved to be a constant problem for the Austrians, the Albanians did not.
The Albanians that the Austrians encountered were a fractured people living in
a hopeless array of pseudo-independent tribes and feudal microstates without
even a unified language. The Austrians believed that if it could help mold the
Albanians into a nation, this nation would serve as a valuable tool for further
Austrian expansion and as faithful allies. Based upon this theory, Austria
engaged in a number of activities meant to construct a unified Albanian nation,
including creating the national mythology of the Albanians using the racial
ethnology so popular in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century
Central Europe. Hence the Albanians suddenly became the descendents of the
ancient Illyrians and Pelazgi, who of course were of "Aryan" racial
stock, volksschwarm. This nineteenth century propaganda theory has
become a fundamental pillar of Albanian national thought ever since.
Today, the only reason any serious scholars
lend any credit whatsoever to the "Illyrian Theory" is because of the
unique nature of the Albanian language which does suggest that it is a
carryover of original Balkan aboriginal language. Even if we allow for this,
there can be no doubt that the barbarian invasions of the fifth through eighth
centuries firmly eradicated any links between the natives of Albania and the
ancient Illyrians. Between these centuries, the Balkans were invaded by a
succession of barbarian hordes- Goths, Huns, Avars, Serbs, Croats, Bulgars, and
so on.
It is interesting to note that it was not
until the eleventh century, after the barbarian invasions, that the Albanians
are mentioned as such in history. The Albanian nationalists claim that the name
"Albania" and "Albanians" is based upon the description
given by the second century geographer Ptolemy of Alexandria who mentioned a
tribe called the "Albanoi". While this is obviously the origin of the
term "Albania" it was neither coined nor used by the Albanians
themselves. They refer to their land as "Shaqip" and themselves as
"Shaqip'ri" and freely admit that the origin of this word has been
lost to history. Aside from this distant mention of the "Albanoi",
the first historical mention of Albanians as such occurred in a report by the
Byzantine Emperor Alexius I Comnenus in 1081 CE. 6 There is nothing
particularly odd about a Byzantine Emperor using a classical name to describe
the natives of a particular area, especially if no other name was readily
apparent.
Albania remained under Roman and Byzantine
nominal rule until 1204 CE, however this rule was very nominal and mostly
concentrated on the coast. In the interior, the Albanians remained divided into
a patchwork of de facto independent tribal groups constantly at odds with one
another. In 1204, Albania briefly passed to Venice with the Norman conquest of
Constantinople and then quickly became part of independent Greek Despotate of
Epirus and later became a Norman Kingdom founded by Charles I of Anjou, where
it remained nominally under Naples until the coming of the Turks. In all this,
there was no expression of Albanian nationalism whatsoever. The Albanians were
relatively free to lead their traditional lives, fragmented into a myriad of
tribes and Albanian loyalty was not to their ethnic group or culture but to
their particular tribe. However, medieval culture had played a role in Albania
and the tribes now also had to compete with patchwork of small independent
feudal lordships, which came to somewhat replace the tribe as the focus of
Albanian culture in the lowlands and coastal areas.
In 1385, the independent Albanian ruler of
Durres, Karl Thopia, made a grave mistake which was to change Albanian history
dramatically. He invited the Ottoman Turks into Albania in order to help him
defeat his Albanians rivals of the Balsha family. From this introduction to the
Balkans, the Ottomans began gradually expanding their foothold slowly
conquering Albania one tribe or feudal lordship at a time. By the 1440's almost
all Albanians recognized the threat to their traditional lifestyles and
religion posed by the Turks. In 1443 an Albanian general who was trained by and
served as an Ottoman officer, Gjerg Kastrioti, managed to unite the various
petty lords and tribal chieftains of Albania under his command to resist the
Turks. "Skenderbeg" as he became known, led a highly successful
resistance to the Turks and created the very first de facto independent
Albanian State. Between 1443 and 1468 "Skenderbeg" kept the Turks at
bay and became a hero across Christiandom. The famous black two-headed eagle on
a red field banner, the national emblem of Albania, was his family's banner.
This brief period represented the first and last expression of anything
approximating Albanian nationalism until 1878.
After the collapse of
"Skenderbeg's" Albanian resistance, Albania quickly fell to the
Turks. Under the Turks, Albania still maintained a degree of autonomy for a
while but this was later ended when the Turks instituted the timar
system to Albania. 7 Under this system, notable military commanders
from throughout the Sultanate were awarded landed estates in Albania and the
retired officer would become a pasha. The sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries also saw a massive campaign on the part of the Turks to convert the
Albanians to Islam. While many Albanians converted to Islam voluntarily hoping
to win the favour of their Ottoman overlords, many others were forcibly
converted by the Turks.
It was during these campaigns to convert
the Albanians and the institution of the timar system that the Albanians
divided into their two primary groups, the Ghegs and the Tosks. According to
the Albanian national mythology this division has existed since ancient times
with the Illyrians being the forefathers of the Tosks and the Pelazgi being the
forefathers of the Ghegs. In truth however, this division did not exist until
the Ottoman period and happened as a direct result of Ottoman activities in
Albania. In the face of Ottoman oppression, some Albanians opted to flee into
the rugged wilderness of the northern mountains. These Albanians became the Ghegs,
living in traditional tribal units and leading a pastoral existence almost
completely free from Turkish intervention and administration. Other Albanians,
however, opted to remain in the lowlands under the Turks, serving a peasant
labour for the Turkish pashas. These became the Tosks and led a
considerably more stable lifestyle than the Ghegs. The isolation of the two
groups led to the distinct dialects that define Ghegs and Tosks.
Everything remained pretty much the same
until 1878, which was the exact year that Albanian nationalism was born. Before
looking at the events that led to the creation of the "Albanian League of
Prizren", we should look at the status of the Albanians in latter
nineteenth century.
At the time, the Albanian people were all
under at least nominal Ottoman control. The lands inhabited by the Albanian
people were divided between the four Turkish vilayets (provinces) of
Kosova, Shkodra, Monastir, and Janina. Albanian society was divided along both
cultural (Gheg and Tosk) lines as well as religious lines (Sunni Muslim,
Bektashi Muslim, Eastern Orthodox, and Roman Catholic). Albanian society was
dominated by conservative Islamic religious leaders and landed beys who
had a virtual monopoly on education among Albanians. Even the much flouted
Albanian language did not in fact constitute a single unified language, being
deeply divided by not only a myriad of regional dialects and the lack of an
alphabet, but also the fact that the Turks suppressed the Albanian language. 8
All said, there was no basis whatsoever for the creation of an Albanian nation
except the abstract ethnic connection. Otto von Bismarck was not mistaken when
he claimed in 1878 that there was no such thing as a Albanian nation.
1878 was a year of great importance to the Albanians.
With the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the Congress of
Berlin decided to cede the Albanian regions of Gusinje and Pllav to the
Principality of Montenegro, thereby removing a portion of the Albanian
population from the Ottoman Sultanate. This proved to be the spark that led to
the birth of Albanian nationalism. A group of about eighty leading Albanian
writers and leaders gathered together at Prizren and founded the "Albanian
League" as well as issued the "Prizren League Program of 1878"
meant to express the demands of the Albanian people to the Congress of Berlin.
The Program demanded that all Albanians be united into one territory (which was
the birth of the 'Greater Albania' notion), and that this territory be allowed
full autonomy within the Ottoman Sultanate. It also demanded a right to the
taxes collected, schooling in the Albanian language, and religious freedom.
Although the Program had little effect, it did represent the birth of Albanian
nationalism and the very first time that the Albanians had tried to state their
national aspirations. However, the Albanian League was still dominated by
conservative Islamic landowners, hence Albanian nationalism was born on a
conservative base and only held together by encouraging ethnic chauvinism as
ethnicity was the only basis upon which an Albanian nation could claim to
exist.
As the influence of the Ottomans began to
wane in the Balkans, Austria-Hungary decided to put forth a comprehensive
effort to replace the Sublime Porte as the leading power in the Balkans. As
mentioned earlier, the Austrians saw the disunited scattering of Albanians as a
valuable potential tool in its desire to expand its influence in the Balkans.
Here was, more or less, an non-national ethnic group that could be molded by
the Austrians into a nation in order to help Austria-Hungary. As already
mentioned, the entire "Illyrian Theory" was created by Austria in
order to provide the Albanians with the pre- requisite national mythology
needed to create a nation. However, this was only one aspect of the Austrians
efforts to form a new cohesive Albanian nation. Vienna launched a series of
cultural initiatives directed toward the Albanians. Among these initiatives
Vienna began publishing various books perpetuating both the new national
mythology but also romanticizing Albanian history. They created the first
Albanian coat of arms and encouraged the use of "Skenderbeg's" family
standard as the Albanian national flag. Austria also began publishing various
grammars in order to unify the many dialects spoken by Albanians as well as
contributed to the adoption of the Latin based alphabet which was formerly
adopted in 1909 as Albanian's first standard alphabet.
The ideology of Albanian nationalism
remained almost exclusively based upon ethnology even though by means of
Austrian aid, a real Albanian nationality was slowly starting to emerge. This,
however, was largely centered in Albania proper and was slower to spread in the
Albanian populated areas of Serbia and Macedonia. After Austria's defeat in the
Great War, Albania proper came under the influence of Italy, while the newly
formed Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia), took over
administration of Kosovo and Macedonia. Considering the ethnic nature of Albanian
nationalism, it cannot be surprising that so many Albanians supported first
fascist Italy, and with Italy's defeat, Nazi Germany. After all, armed with
their Austrian created national myth, they could claim to be of good
"Aryan" stock. The pro-Italian Albanian premier, Mustafa Merlika
Kruja, managed to reduce Albanian opposition to the Italians and many Albanians
joined Fascist formations, including four legions of Fascist Blackshirts formed
for home duty in Albania as well as the Albanian Royal Guard, which was sent to
Italy to serve as part of King Vittorio Emmanuele II's royal body guard.
In 1940/41 many Albanian nationalists began
to fully adopt not only Italian fascist organization, but also ideology. After
the defeat of the Balkans, Kosovo, for the first time in its history was
joined, with other territories, to Albania proper. The only time there has ever
been a 'Greater Albania' was during this period. Albania at this time had two
partisan resistance movements, the Communists led by Enver Hoxha and the Balisti
which was a Muslim movement based in northern Albanian and Kosovo. The Balisti,
while opposed to the Italians, supported the Germans against the Communists
after the German occupation of Albania in 1943. It was these northern Albanian
and Kosovo Albanian collaborationists who were later formed into the short
lived "21st Albanian-SS Mountain Division
"Skenderbeg" and these were the same Albanians who rounded up and
exported the entire Jewish community of Kosovo to the German camps in the
north. All said, over 32,000 Albanians, especially from the northern mountains,
Kosovo, and Macedonia fought for the Axis cause. 9
The fourth and final major influence on
modern Albanian nationalism came from the victory of Communism in the East.
Kosovo and Macedonia again returned to Yugoslavia which angered many Albanian
nationalists, but in the immediate post-war situation, most nationalists had
either fled into exile, been executed, or gone underground. In Albania proper,
Enver Hoxha established a Stalinistic dictatorship that would last until 1990.
In Yugoslavia, however, Tito came to power, and though Communist, he soon had a
falling out with the Soviet Union and was expelled from the Comintern. Being
the sole non-Soviet satellite East European Communist country, the Soviets
encouraged the Hoxha's Albania to stimulate nationalist sentiments among the
Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia. This Hoxha did, unabated until his death in
1985. In turn, many Yugoslav Albanians, especially post World War II ones, began
to look to Hoxha as a role model of unadulterated Communism as opposed to the
Yugoslav regime which was viewed as a perversion of Communism.
Looking back, we can see that not only was
the Albanian desire to maintain ethnic solidarity the spark the launched
Albanian nationalism in 1878, but it is the only continual factor running
through the history of Albanian nationalism. The four formative factors of
modern Albanian Nationalism-the desire to remain unified under the Ottomans
(1878-1881), the Austrian creation of the Albanian nation (1878-1914), the
experimentation with Fascism (1920's-1945), and the adoration of Enver Hoxha
(1945-1985)---have all had only one common thread, the desire for the creation
of a "Greater Albania". As we will see, little has changed.
The Ideology of the KLA
Conventional wisdom tends to suggest that
the KLA is essentially a Marxist-Leninist group, however, in truth this is not
really an accurate statement. While it is certainly true that various Communist
ideas have played an important role, at least among KLA political leadership,
both their origins and actions tend to suggest that ideology is of considerably
lesser importance than the basic ethno- nationalist goal. When trying to
describe the KLA ideology, Chris Hedges said it displayed "hints of
fascism on one side and whiffs of Communism on the other...."10
In view of the very practical nature of the KLA and its apparent willingness to
utilize any ideological angle to further their own goals, this is probably the
best one line description of KLA ideology to be found.
Even now, Communists still like to claim
that the KLA is a strictly Marxist-Leninist organization, even though as we
will see, this is not really true. "The original core [of the KLA] was
made up militants who were fascinated by the unadulterated Marxism of Enver
Hoxha in nearby Albania. They took part in the student's protests of Pristina
in 1981...."11 This observation is partially true, as certainly
of few of the Kosovo Albanian leaders of today were, and are, diehard Marxists
who participated in the demonstrations of 1981. One of the Kosovo Albanian
representatives to the peace talks in France, Hydajet Hyseni, was one of the
leaders of those student protests in 1981. Even though he is not really a
member of the KLA, he is a leading member of the United Democratic Movement,
the LBD, which has close ties to the KLA's Political Bureau. However, like so
many of the Albanian Nationalists, it should also be remembered that the same
Hydajet Hyseni was also once a vice-president of the nationalist Democratic
league of Kosovo, the LDK, led by Kosovo's most famous anti-Communist writer
and political leader, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova. 12 This mixing of
Communism, anti-Communism, and ideological neutrality seems to be a major
aspect of the KLA leadership, strongly suggesting that the KLA has an official
policy of wearing whatever face is most likely to be accepted depending upon
their audience.
Although we will go into it in further
detail later, LPK13 was an integral part of what later became the
KLA. The LPK was established when a number of illegal Kosovo
nationalist/Communist organizations merged together in the wake of the 1981
student demonstrations. At the time of the LPK's formation it was an
exclusively Communist organization which received financial and other backing,
inherited from some of its constituent organizations, from Hoxha's Albania.
While we'll go into this in further detail below, the reason this is mentioned
now is because as long as the Kosovo Albanian militant resistance could only
secure backing from Communist Albania, it remained Communist. After the
collapse of Communism in Albania, the LPK also renounced its Marxist-Leninism
as well. As we'll see later, the KLA has gone so far as to have an active
alliance with the nationalist anti-Communist former President of Albania and
present Albanian rebel, Sali Berisha.
Anyway, the LPK was, and is, one of the
primary sources for what became the KLA. The LPK was established to be a
terrorist organization based upon the general example of the Irish Republican
Army, and a large percentage of the KLA's leadership, not only the political
leadership, but also the military leadership began as LPK activists. Because so
much of the KLA leadership started out in the LPK, it is somewhat fair to say
that the KLA had its origins in Communism.
This conclusion, however, completely over
looks the very serious contribution of the Democratic League of Kosovo, the
LDK. The LDK was formed by a group of scholars led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, who
is universally recognized as Kosovo's leading anti-Communist writer. The LDK
was established in the wake of the loss of autonomy for Kosovo in 1989 and
quickly became the primary political formation of the Albanians in Kosovo as
most other political parties among the Albanians joined the "Council of
Political Parties" which was also headed by Rugova. While admittedly, few
of the KLA's militants have origins in the LDK (Rugova being noted as strong
defender of 'passive resistance' techniques), much of its political leadership
does.
So KLA has two, relatively opposed, points
of origin, one Communist the other anti-Communist. This allows the KLA to
present whatever face is more likely to be accepted to outsiders. The question
becomes, with such a diverse range of ideological perspectives represented
within the KLA, what is it that unites these Albanians into a cohesive force
against Yugoslavia?
The answer to this question is the same as
it has always been, the ethno-nationalist desire to create a "Greater Albania".
Looking back, this has been the sole unifying factor of Albanian nationalists
since 1878 and nothing has really changed. From one of the new leaders of the
KLA-spawned PBD14 the former KLA representative to London, Pleurat
Sejdiu laments, "We know we can't achieve independence for Kosova right
now, or unite all the Albanian lands. It's not realistic right now." 15
Or, as leading KLA spokesman Jakup Krasniqi made crystal clear, "We want
more than independence: the reunification of all Albanians on the
Balkans." 16 None of this is particularly new, if one so
desired, one could find similar quotes endorsing "Greater Albania" by
virtually the entire KLA leadership, both political and military, as well as
the vast majority of the voluntary rank and file.
Bear in mind also, that "Greater
Albania" does not just include Kosovo and Albania proper. There is at
present a map in circulation among KLA supporters, including the
Albanian-American Civic League (AACL), which depicts the desired "Greater
Albania". The Albanian nationalists are not just after Kosovo, but slices
of Serbia proper, a slice of Montenegro, a huge part of Macedonia, as well as a
portion of Greece. 17 More than this, as we'll see later, not only
is this the KLA ideal, but it is one upon which they have already begun working
on in neighboring Macedonia as well.
Ultimately, one must conclude that while
individual members of the KLA may hold strong ideological beliefs of one
persuasion or another, the KLA as a whole does not. The sole unifying factor
appears to be the ethno-nationalist desire for "Greater Albania" as
has been the case throughout the history of Albanian nationalism.
History of Albanian Nationalist violence
and the KLA
The KLA is the end result of a long line of
Albanian irredentist terrorist organizations. Violence, on one scale or another
has accompanied Albanian nationalism since its inception at Prizren in 1878. In
this section we will review the evolution of Albanian militancy and show the
KLA's descent from it.
With the formation of the Albanian League
in 1878, the writers and scholars who originally formed the League quickly
spread word of its formation among the various Albanian communities within the
Balkans as the delegates returned to their homes after the conference. While
this idea was only moderately accepted by the more conservative beys, it
received a much more enthusiastic welcome from the northern tribal chieftains
who formed an alliance which successfully repulsed the Montenegrins from
claiming the Albanian populated regions awarded to it by the Congress of
Berlin. This early alliance was also endorsed and supported by the Sublime
Porte which armed, trained, and otherwise supported the Albanian guerillas.
However, in 1880, after the Western powers opted to grant Montenegro Dulcigno
instead of the Albanian populated regions of Gusinje and Pllav, the emphasis
shifted away from the Albanians. With this shift of emphasis, the Sultan no
longer had any use for the Albanian League, and actually began to view it as a
threat to the stability of the Ottoman territories within the Balkans. In 1881,
Sultan Abdulhamid II lauched a military operation against the League and
completely crushed it, or so the Turks had hoped.
The Albanian League, suddenly losing not
only its backing from the Sultan, but also being banned and repressed, went
underground in reaction. This did not, however, mean that the militants
returned to their homes and gave up the struggle, nor did it mean that they had
lost their interest in unifying all Albanians into a single entity. This was
also the period in which the Austrians were molding the Albanian people into a
nation, which only encouraged further Albanian nationalist agitation against
the Turks. With the collapse of the Sultanate and the rise of the Young Turks
to power in 1908/9, the repression against Albanian nationalism suddenly took
on a more enthusiastic guise by the Turkish nationalists. This pushed the
Albanian League into action once again. Knowing that the Turks were in
disarray, having the tacit approval of the Austrians, and a newly built and
repressed nationalism to express, the Albanian League again opted for armed
resistance against the Turks. The revolt began with a major Albanian
insurrection April through June of 1910 and was quickly and brutally crushed by
means of a large Turkish Army. Although the Albanian insurrection mostly
collapsed under the weight of Turkish military superiority, resistance
continued, mostly terrorist in nature. With the outbreak of the First Balkan
War in 1912, the Albanians, still led by the Albanian League again revolted and
declared the very first fully independent Albanian state in the history of
Albanians. Of course, the new Albanian state was basically created by the
intervention of Austria-Hungary who quickly occupied Albania at the outbreak of
the Great War in 1914.
The end of the Great War saw the collapse
of Austria-Hungary and the rise of Italian influence in Albanian proper. The
Italians quickly made themselves unwelcome and some resistance began against
them. With the help of Yugoslavia, an Albanian chieftain, Ahmed Zogu, became
president of the republic of Albania in 1924, and four years later became King
Zog I of Albania. At the same time, in Kosovo, nationalist agitation to join
Kosovo to Albania found expression in the creation of the fully terrorist
"Kosovo Committee". So while the Serbs were helping establish Ahmad
Zogu in Albania to counter Italian influence, the Albanians within Yugoslavia
were organizing terrorist groups. With the final departure of the Turks from
the Balkans, Serbs again began resettling Kosovo, frustrating Albanian attempts
to create a situation in which Yugoslavia would have no choice but to surrender
Kosovo to Albania. Albanian terrorism in kosovo began to increase as more Serbs
began to return to Kosovo.
With the rise of Mussolini in Italy, the
"Kosovo Committee" found patronage from Italy in order to advance the
Italian desire to cause trouble for Yugoslavia. Although most Albanians in
Albanian proper resisted the encroachment of Fascist Italy, the Albanians of
the "Kosovo Committee" had no such inhibitions, being that they had
never lived under Italian domination before. With Italian patronage, the
"Kosovo Committee" grew steadily more violent in their efforts to
drive the Serbs as well as everyone else of non-Albanian ethnicity, out of
Kosovo. At Italian instigation, the "Kosovo Committee" formed and
alliance with the pro-Bulgarian (Axis) VMRO in Macedonia, as well as the
pro-Nazi Croat Ustashi, in order to launch joint attacks and share intelligence
against Yugoslavia. The 'Kosovo Committee" grew even stronger after Italy
invaded and annexed Albania proper in 1939. With the German conquest of
Yugoslavia in 1941, Kosovo and part of Macedonia were ceded to Italian occupied
Albania, creating the first and only "Greater Albania" to ever exist.
The Italians, generally despised by
Albanians since the end of the Great War in 1918, presented a major problem for
Albanian nationalists. Some nationalists opted to shy away from nationalism,
adopting the Communism of Hoxha and the other Communist partisan leaders,
converting their ethnic nationalism into Leninist style class nationalism.
Among the nationalists who refused to part with the ethnic basis of Albanian
nationalism, a division occurred between the pro- and anti- Italian factions.
The pro-Italian nationalists ended up serving in the puppet Albanian national
Army, the Italian Fascist Blackshirt legions, or the various Italian backed
police and anti- partisan formations. The anti-Italian nationalists ended up
forming the anti-Communist, anti-Italian Balisti political/partisan
movement. This division among the the pro- and anti- Italian nationalists
continued until the fall of Italy in 1943. With the collapse of Italy, Germany
occupied and assumed control of "Greater Albania". With the coming of
the Germans, both the pro-Italian Albanian Fascists and the anti-Italian Balisti
nationalists joined with the Germans to oppose the Hoxha's Communist partisans.
With the collapse of the Axis, many Albanian Fascists escaped the Balkans
settling all over the West where many of them set up 駑igr・ organizations that survived through the Cold War in one guise or
another. Those who didn't escape continued fighting knowing that they had
nothing to expect from either Hoxha or Tito except execution. One fascist band,
"Saban Paluza" continued its resistance in Kosovo until 1951.
With the rise of Communism throughout
Eastern Europe and the division of the world into the two opposing sides of the
Cold War, Albanian nationalists adopted the lingo of Communism and laid low for
a few years. However, Tito's refusal to become a Soviet puppet resulted in
Yugoslavia being expelled from the Comintern in 1948 and Yugoslavia opting to
build closer relations with Western Europe. In view of this insolence, the
Soviets encouraged Hoxha to use the Albanian nationalists of Kosovo as a means
of destabilizing Yugoslavia. In accordance with this initiative, Hoxha began
seeking out Kosovo Albanians to support against Tito. However, it wasn't until
the 1960's that this policy really began to start causing Tito problems, with
the 'Revolutionary Committee for the Liberation of Kosovo." Taking
advantage of the turmoil among young students and other dissatisfied people in
Kosovo, the 1960's saw a dramatic growth in not only the number of Kosovo
Albanian terrorist groups, but also an escalation in general nationalism. This
trend reached major proportions in student led demonstrations throughout Kosovo
in 1968.
The granting of autonomy to Kosovo in 1974
quieted down the demonstrations and mass agitation, but also encouraged the
serious nationalists to continue their resistance. The 1970's and early 1980's
saw the rise of a myriad of Communist based, Albanian nationalist groups in
Kosovo. Among these were five significant groups, the "National Liberation
Movement of Kosovo and Other Parts of Yugoslavia", "Kosovo
Marxist-Leninist Organization", "Communist Marxist-Leninist party of
Albanians in Yugoslavia", "Red National Front", and the
"Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo". In the wake of the
major student demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981, these five groups merged into
one new organization, the aforementioned "Popular Movement for Kosovo"
or LPK. As noted above, the LPK was one of the primary parents of the KLA.
As for the KLA18 itself, it has
been claimed that it was first formed in either 1991 or 1993. However, its
first notice in the West occurred in 1996 when it claimed responsibility for a
series of minor sabotage bombings in Kosovo. At first, Rugova and the LDK
thought that it was a Serbian front serving an agent provocateur role in Kosovo
in order to justify further Serbian aggression against the Albanians. Rugova,
being a pacifist, flatly rejected the KLA at first. At the time, the LPK was
tame, following Rugova's lead and refraining from violence. However, it would
seem that a large number of LPK activists were ready to fight, so they entered
into alliance with the original KLA under Adem Jashari and quickly came to
dominate the organization with their greater experience and resources.
The KLA inside Kosovo
Being that the KLA is obviously considered
a criminal organization to the Yugoslav officials in Kosovo, it cannot be
surprising that that there are two distinctive realms of KLA activity, one
inside Kosovo and the other outside. The following two subheadings will look at
the KLA as it exists inside and outside of Kosovo.
Unlike some of the earlier terrorist
organization in Kosovo who were essentially outside creations from Albania, the
KLA appears to be an entirely Kosovo Albanian creation. After a decade of
Rugova's passive resistance campaign failing to accomplish much for the
Albanians of Kosovo in the face of serious Yugoslav oppression and discrimination,
it cannot be surprising that such a group would come into existence there.
The KLA started out as a purely terrorist
organization in Kosovo attacking Yugoslav targets by means of bombs and small
scale assaults against policemen and village officials. The KLA learned the
lesson of earlier Kosovo terrorists that the Serbs could be provoked into over
reaction when confronted with particularly outrageous attacks. Examples of this
abound, such as September 2, 1987 when an Albanian terrorist, Aziz Keljmendi
sneaked into a Yugoslav military barracks and murdered four conscripts in their
sleep and wounded several others. The Yugoslavs reacted by launching a series
of raids against largely innocent Albanian political activists, agitating the
Albanian populace undeservedly. Hence, it has been reported, "For several
months, the Kosovar guerrilla has been pushing the Serbs across the fault line
by multiplying its attacks against individual police officers. Thus it tries to
provoke a massive reaction by the forces of Milosevic. This strategy is
classical...."19 In the case of policemen, according to
official Yugoslav statistics, between January 1 and August 30, 1998 there were
616 attacks against individual policemen in Kosovo, wherein 74 of them were
killed and 282 seriously wounded. 20
The KLA understood, at least prior to the
NATO occupation, that although it had evolved by that time into a large and
strong guerilla army, it was simply not strong enough to hold its ground
against the Yugoslav military. Hence, the KLA intentionally participated in
operations meant to provoke the Yugoslavs into a response so that they could
show the world how they were the victims. In accordance to this policy, the KLA
has intentionally carried out attacks against Serbian civilians in order to
generate terror and encourge the Serbs of Kosovo to leave. A fine example of
this is the widespread kidnapping of Serbian civilians. While sometimes
kidnapped civilians are returned in exchange for the family leaving their home,
many times this is not the case, such as the twenty two kidnapped Serbs found
in the mass grave near the village of Klecka in 1998. Otherwise, the KLA will
often simply round up all the Serbs of a particular village, murder or maim the
able bodied males and send them walking through the war zone toward the nearest
Yugoslav military position.
As the reader might not be too surprised to
learn that the KLA has used atrocity and violence in an attempt to expel the
Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo; it might come as more of a surprise to
learn that the KLA also actively attacks all other non-Albanian ethnic groups
in Kosovo. This policy is in direct accordance with their professed aims
turning Kosovo into an entirely Albanian province for later joining to Albania
proper without the problem of adding new national minorities to "Greater
Albania". The KLA not only attacks Serbs and Montenegrins, but also Rom
(Gypsies), Serbian speaking Moslems, Turks, and especially non-supportive
fellow Albanians and Albanian Roman Catholics. Incidents such as the April 14
beating of an Albanian man and the brutal gang rape of his wife in the village
of Budrsavci, because the man voted in Yugoslav elections are not uncommon. The
KLA has flatly declared that any participation in Yugoslav institutions
constitutes a punishable offence.
Regarding the KLA treatment of fellow
Albanians, the KLA has, by strength of arms, more or less assumed the right to
rule all Albanians within its territory. Many in the West have mistakenly
interpreted the massive swelling of the KLA ranks in the last few months as a
sign of massive popular support for the KLA. This is not really true as it has
been severely under reported in the West that the KLA has instituted a policy
of forced conscription. As reported in the April 1st edition of the
Chicago Tribune, immediately after NATO started its bombing campaign, the KLA
ordered all Albanian men of fighting age (18-55) to "join its ranks within
one month or face unspecified consequences". Many of the Albanian men
being evicted by the Yugoslavs were forcibly recruited by KLA press gangs
immediately after entering KLA controlled territory. Of course, this is the
treatment reserved for Albanian Muslims, Albanian Catholics merely have to fear
random beatings and the occasional massacre at the hands of the KLA. A fine
example of this being the August 6th massacre at the village of Mece
where four Albanian Catholics were dragged into the street and executed.
Using arms and equipment taken from
Yugoslav forces as well as imported from Albania, the KLA has evolved into a
full fledged guerilla insurgency, but even at that, they are not a match for
the well trained and equipped Yugoslav military, or the Serbian paramilitary
formations, many of which gained combat experience in the war in Bosnia.
Therefore, although the KLA can present the face of a legitimate national
liberation movement to the Western reporters, inside Kosovo, many of their
actions are still those of simple terrorists.
The KLA outside of Kosovo
The KLA outside of Kosovo can be divided
into two major divisions, the network built up to support the fighters in
Kosovo and the KLA military assaults against neighboring Macedonia. Not
surprisingly, the KLA support network is primarily based in Albania proper,
with important sections being based elsewhere in the West.
The KLA has devised an excellent financial
network in order to back its operations in Kosovo. This network is based upon
the Domovina Zove, foundation established in Switzerland and having
branch offices throughout Western Europe as well as the Kosovo
"Government- in-exile" based in Bonn, Germany. The Domovina Zove
was designed to serve as a fund raising network for the KLA raising money from
contributions made by Albanians living and working in Western Europe. This
entity uses the Dardania Bank in Tirana to filter in money raised in the West
for use by the KLA. The 'Government-in-exile" based in Germany is not
officially part of the KLA, but instead serves as the primary Western financial
institution of the "Kosovo Government" under the presidency of
Rugova. The official "Government of Kosovo" has imposed a three
percent income tax on all Kosovo Albanians living abroad. These funds are
handled by the "Government- in-Exile" based in Bonn, and transferred,
when needed to Kosovo via Tirana. The "Government of Kosovo" through
the "Government-in Exile" has also invested money into enterprises
that have proved invaluable to the KLA.
For example, the
"Government-in-Exile", under Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, contributed large
amounts of money to the election campaign of Sali Berisha in Albania proper. In
exchange for this, Berisha officially recognized the "Government of
Kosovo" and allowed Rugova's government official diplomatic status in
Tirana. After Berisha's fall from power in 1997, accompanied with the complete
collapse of Albania into anarchy, Berisha built up his northern family estate
into a massive compound and formed his own militia, which is equal in size and
strength to the official Albanian military. Berisha refused to recognize the
legitimacy of his successors to the government of Albania and became disruptive
by launching a series of demonstrations, riots, and actual attacks against the
official government based in Tirana.
Although Berisha is still a major factor in
Yugoslavia through both his "Democratic Party" as well as his
militia, he is also a major player in the aiding the KLA. Berisha is based on
his family estate in Prist, near Tropoje however, he has become an almost de
facto independent ruler of northern Albania. In so doing he has allowed the KLA
to establish major command centers and training camps at Bajram Curi, Tropoja,
Krum, Kuks, and Peskopeja. It is also almost certain that Berisha controls the
local mafia of northern Albania which is primarily involved in narcotics
smuggling into Europe and arms trafficking. Contrary to Yugoslav claims, it
appears unlikely that that Berisha actually finances the KLA in any significant
way, but he does allow the KLA to use territories under his control and
probably sells weapons to the KLA. Although there have been no accounts of
Berisha's private militia joining with KLA bands in raids into Kosovo, there
have been many reports of the KLA assisting Berisha's militia in Northern
Albania. It has also been firmly established that while Berisha was in charge
of the Albanian government that he provided a large degree of logistical
support to the KLA.
When the Berisha government fell in 1997
and the country slipped into virtual anarchy, hundreds of thousands of weapons
and other military equipment were looted from Albanian armories across the
country, flooding Albania with military style weaponry. While many of these
weapons remain in the hands of private citizens and competing mafias, it is believed
that a great many of the weapons found their way to Berisha, who in turn sold
them to the KLA. Through other agents in Tirana and using Domovina Zove
money, the KLA has also purchased other weaponry and equipment from the open
market, especially from Bosnia-Hercegovina.
In the same vein as the KLA's demand that
all able bodied men within Kosovo join its ranks, the KLA has also made a
similar demand upon Kosovo Albanians living elsewhere. According to the
Washington Times (April 20, 1999), the only Albanians that the KLA considers
exempt are those who are ill or those who are in a position to significantly
aid the KLA financially. According to the same report, the KLA has raised
literally thousands of volunteers from the United States, Germany, Switzerland,
Italy and other countries. Of course the vast majority of these recruits have
absolutely no military training at all, so they are formed into "foreign
units" and largely used as either cannon fodder or for propaganda
purposes.
To supplement their manpower with trained
fighters, the KLA has also relied heavily upon foreign mercenaries and Islamic
fundamentalist mujahedin from elsewhere. At the training facilities in
northern Albania, mercenaries and other former officers from Albania, Croatia,
Bosnia-Hercegovina, and elsewhere have been training KLA volunteers, recruits,
and conscripts. At the same time many Islamic fundamentalist mujahedin, many of
whom are combat experienced fighters (veterans from other jihads in
Afghanistan, Sudan, and the Kashmir), have been identified in Albania proper.
However, the U.S. as well as INTERPOL has been working with the legitimate
government of Albania to keep these mujahedin out of Albania. Thus far,
there has only been one confirmed report of mujahedin actually fighting
inside of Kosovo, and that was a mixed unit serving in a support role for KLA
units in the Drenica region in late 1998. There are exhaustive reports online
detailing various stories of the KLA- Mujahedin cooperation in Kosovo,
but it is hard to say exactly how far this cooperation actually goes.
Otherwise, the KLA is similar to other
national liberation movements, running various publications around the world,
maintaining information services and representatives in the major capitals of
Western Europe. Now that they have been de facto recognized by NATO, and its
peacekeeping force now occupying Kosovo, KFOR; the majority of diplomatic
activity with the KLA has dealt with the KLA's obligation under the terms of
the NATO occupation to disarm. A condition that the KLA leadership has flatly
rejected. Instead, the KLA wants to be armed, uniformed, and trained by NATO
and set up as a "National Guard" in Kosovo.
The other aspect of KLA activity outside of
Kosovo deals with its actions in Macedonia. Like Kosovo, most of Macedonia is
also part of the projected "Greater Albania". December 16, 1997
represented the first KLA attack in Macedonia, bombing the courthouse of the
town of Gostivar. This was immediately followed by KLA attacks on the police
stations in the villages of Kumanovo and Prilep on January 4, 1998.
The KLA has made no secret whatsoever of
its desire to annex most of western Macedonia into "Greater Albania"
even though this territory has not been part of Yugoslavia for years and the
Serbian influence there is minimal. Make no mistake about it, the KLA does seek
a "Greater Albania" not merely an end to Yugoslav oppression in
Kosovo. Under these circumstances, it must have taken a great deal of pressure
on the Macedonian government for them to allow in the influx of Albanian
refugees in the wake of the NATO bombing campaign.
It would seem that the Macedonians are
already regretting this humanitarian gesture. On April 22, Macedonian Interior
Minister, Pavle Trajanov, reported that KLA arms caches totaling about 4.5 tons
of firearms, grenades, and ammunition have been discovered in several
Macedonian locations. 21 It has also been reported that, although
Macedonian officials prevent the operation of KLA press gangs in its territory,
that the KLA has still managed to win over almost a thousand recruits from
among the Albanian refugees in Macedonia.
Conclusion
Once upon a time, the United States decided
to support the Afghan mujahedin as a means of slowing Soviet expansion;
in return men with ties to our former allies decided to bomb the World Trade
Center in New York. Another time, the United States opted to support Saddam
Hussein as a means of slowing Soviet expansion and then as a means of trying to
contain Islamic Revolutionary Iran; in return we ended up having to launch the
largest U.S. military operation since the Vietnam War to expel our former ally
from Kuwait. It seems extremely likely that we are making this same mistake yet
again by supporting the Kosovo Liberation Army as a means of attacking Milosevic.
As this paper has tried to show, the KLA is
not a national liberation movement in that the only nation concerned is the
Albanian one. Nor is the KLA merely a reaction to the very real discrimination
and oppression faced by the Albanians of Kosovo since 1989. The KLA isn't some
enlightened political movement seeking to free themselves from tyranny either.
Instead, the KLA is an ethnic nationalist group, what we commonly refer to as
neo-fascist in the West, that not only seeks to turn Kosovo into part of their
desired "Greater Albania" but also most of Macedonia, as well as
parts of Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro. The presently existing friendly
relations between NATO and the KLA are a temporory arrangement as the KLA needs
NATO aid in Kosovo for the time being. However, the KLA leadership has made it
clear that it has no intentions of compromising any of its goals for NATO and
if NATO gets in the way, then the KLA will turn against it.
The KLA is not, as the Western media likes
to portray it, our friend and may one day become a horrible enemy.
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ENDNOTES
1 Pleurat Sejdiu, former KLA representative
in London and now a leader of the PBD (Partia e Bashkimit Demokratik, or 'Party
of the Democratic Union'). The PBD is almost entirely lead by members of the
KLA political bureau. Quote cited in the article Politics the KLA Way by Laura
Rosen http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/07/07/kosovo/index.html
2 Adem Demaci, the official head spokesman
of the KLA who served as the KLA's representative in Kosovo before, during, and
after the NATO bombing campaign. Quote taken from an interview conducted by
Edina Becirivic and Merima Sijaric in Pristina and published in the Sarajevo
paper Slobodna Bosna Oct. 31, 1998.
3 The Provincial Statistical Bureau, 1987
4 However, while they did become nominal
Muslims, in truth, they maintained their tribal/clan culture and never really
allowed themselves to wholly adopt Islamic culture.
5 Beys being the Islamic landed gentry of
Albania
6 From the Library of Congress Area
Handbook Series Online, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/altoc.html
7 The timar system was officially ended by
the Ottomans in 1831 and the pashas were succeeded by a new class of private
landowning beys and tribal chieftains known as bajraktars.
8 Another interesting point against the
Albanian national mythology and the "Illyrian Theory" is based upon
language. The Romans never seriously opposed literacy among its subject
peoples, nor did the barbarian invaders that succeeded the Romans. So the
question arises, if the Albanians are legitimate descendents of the Illyrians,
what happened to their written language? The very earliest piece of written
Albanian is from a baptismal formula written in 1462. The very first Albanian
book is a missal book, the "Meshari" written in 1555 and the very
first literary work was the published poems of Jul Variboda dating from the
1700's. So if the modern Albanian language is a descendent of ancient Illyrian,
how is it that the spoken language survived while the written language died
away until it was reinvented by the Austrians in the nineteenth century?
Albanian did not even have a standardized alphabet until 1909, Albanian being
written earlier using a haphazard collection of orthographies using Latin,
Greek, and Turko-Arabic characters.
9 For an excellent review of Albanian
collaborators during World War II, look at "The Forgotten Axis, Germany's
Partners and Foreign Volunteers in World War II" by J. Lee Ready, 1987,
McFarland Press, NC. Or the periodical, "Axis Europa Magazine, the Journal
of Axis Allied Forces, 1939-1945" july-September, 1996, Vol. II No. III;
which contains the article "Albanian collaborationist Forces,
1943-1944" by Antonio J. Munoz.
10 From "Danger! KLA in the USA"
by Norman Grigg, The New American, May 24, 1999
http://www.suc.org/politics/kosovo/html/Grigg052499.html citing the Chris
Hedges essay published in the May-June 1999 issue of "Foreign
Affairs"
11 "The KLA's Maoist Ideology" by
Marc Semo, published in the January 21, 1999 issue of the Communist Parisian
periodical, "Liberation"
12 Hydajet Hyseni biographical information
from the Reuters release, "LDK-KLA Leadership Profiles", Feb. 5,
1999.
13 LPK, the Levizja Popullore e Kosoves, or
the Popular Movement for Kosovo, which is also known as the Kosovo National
Movement.
14 PBD, the Partia e Bashkimit Demokratik,
or Party of Democratic Union.
15 Quote taken from the article,
"Politics the KLA way" by Laura Rosen
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/07/07/kosovo/index.html
16 taken from the article, "The KLA's
Maoist ideology", see above.
17 A copy of this map was once online at a
now defunct Albanian nationalist site and may still be online elsewhere. This
map was also referred to in the already cited article, "Danger! KLA in the
USA", see above.
18 Technically, the Ushtrija Clirimtare e
Kosoves, or UCK, also abbreviated OVK in Serbian sources.
19 Taken from the article "KLA's
Maoist Ideology" see above.
20 From the official Yugoslav site ran by
the Yugoslav Ministry of information,
http://www.gov.yu/kosovo_facts/enter6.html
21 From the "Danger! KLA in the
USA" article already cited, see above.
http://www.suc.org/politics/kosovo/papers/Sigler.html